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Post-Capitalist Property 
Paddy Ireland & Gaofeng Meng 
 
Introduction: Post-Capitalism and the Marx Puzzle 
This paper addresses a puzzle which at first glance might seem rather parochial 
but which is, we believe, of considerable practical as well as theoretical 
importance. The puzzle is that surrounding Marx’s ideas about property and, in 
particular, property in his imagined ‘post-capitalist’ society of the future. It is 
well known that Marx was critical of ‘capitalist private property’ in the means of 
production. In the 1844 Manuscripts, for example, he anticipated with enthusiasm 
the replacement of capitalist societies based on private property by communist 
societies based on ‘truly human and social property’ (Marx, 1970 [1844], p.118). 
In similar vein, in Capital, written twenty years later, he looked forward to the 
‘transformation of capitalistic private property … into socialised property’ (Marx, 
1961 [1867], p.715), and in the Critique of the Gotha Programme contemplated 
the creation of ‘co-operative property’ and a ‘co-operative society based on 
common ownership of the means of production’ (Marx, 2010b [1875], p.345). It 
is often forgotten, however, that in the Manuscripts he also wrote of the need to 
preserve the ‘positive essence of private property’ (Marx, 1970 [1844], p.135); 
that in Capital he anticipated not only the emergence of ‘socialised property’ but 
the simultaneous establishment of ‘individual property’ (Marx, 1961 [1867], 
p.715); and that in The Civil War in France he praised the Paris Commune’s 
attempt to ‘make individual property a truth’ (Marx, 2010a [1871], p.213). Even 
a sympathetic commentator like Chris Arthur is driven to ask, ‘What on earth 
does [this] mean’? (Arthur, 2004, p.114) How can ‘individual property’ and 
‘socialised’/‘truly social property’ in the means of production co-exist?   
 
The search for alternative post- and non-capitalist property forms that reconcile 
the individual and the social has, arguably, never been more urgent. In the West, 
as the social and political consequences of faltering growth, rising debt, and 
increasing inequality, in-work poverty, personal insecurity and social instability 
gradually manifest themselves, many are beginning to question whether a 
financialized capitalism in which more and more of the means and processes of 
production and reproduction have been privatized and marketized can survive. 
Wolfgang Streeck, for example, has abandoned the idea that ‘an alternative, 
socially embedded, domesticated kind of capitalism’ (of the sort associated with 
post-war Germany) can be sustained and, concluding that capitalism’s future is 
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‘bleak’, has begun speculating about how it will end (Streeck, 2012; 2015, 2016; 
see also Wallerstein et al, 2013). In similar vein, others have started hypothesizing 
about what will come after it (Mason, 2015). Even those who think (or assume) 
capitalism will pull through have started pondering the impact of further advances 
in artificial intelligence and automation (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014), with 
some fearing a descent into an unstable and unhappy ‘hyper-capitalist dystopia’ 
(Lanchester 2015, p.8). In its recent quadrennial report on global trends, prepared 
for the incoming President, the US National Intelligence Council agrees that 
technological advances are likely to contribute to ‘a dark and difficult near future’. 
The ‘central puzzle’ facing ‘governments and societies’, it suggests, is ‘how to 
blend individual, collective, and national endowments in a way that yields 
sustainable security, prosperity, and hope’ (NIC, 2017, ix, 69).  In this context, 
the question of whether it really is possible, as Marx believed, to devise post-
capitalist property forms that blend and reconcile the individual and the social 
seems unusually pertinent.  
 
In this paper, we explore possible resolutions of the ‘Marx puzzle’ by addressing 
two further puzzles, both involving the Household Responsibility System (HRS) 
which emerged in China in the late 1970s. The first centres on land ownership 
under the HRS. Whenever he went to ‘a village, a rural enterprise, or a mosque’, 
Peter Ho tells us, he began by asking ‘a simple question: Who owns the land?’ 
But he didn’t get simple answers: ‘the same plot of land’ was, apparently, ‘owned 
by as many different persons and legal entities as the question was put to …’ (Ho, 
2005, p.2). Seeking an answer to the same question, however, Zhu and Jiang drew 
the rather different conclusion that under the HRS ‘no one in the community is a 
real owner of land’ (Zhu & Jiang, 1993, p.447). Which is it: everyone or no one? 
The second puzzle centres on the HRS’s success in alleviating rural poverty by 
raising productivity and output (Nolan, 1993; Upham, 2009). Believing that the 
creation and allocation of clearly defined and well protected private property 
rights is a pre-requisite of economic development, many commentators have been 
surprised, if not perplexed, by the HRS’s successes. Even now, as China seeks 
further to modernize its agricultural sector, many continue to insist that 
institutional arrangements embodying the sort of ‘fuzzy property’ (Verdery, 1998) 
found in the HRS don’t offer a long term alternative to neoliberal models of 
development based on clearly defined private property rights and free market 
exchange.  The HRS might work in practice, but it will never work in theory. 
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This paper examines the HRS against the backdrop of, firstly, Marx’s ideas about 
property, arguing that Marx provided valuable insights into the historical and 
social relational nature of property and the different social functions it needs to 
perform; and, secondly, against the backdrop of subsequent theorising about the 
legal nature of property in which property has come widely to be conceptualised 
not as a single, unitary, ‘ownership’ right to a thing (or, indeed, as the thing itself) 
but as a ‘bundle-of-rights’. The paper does not seek to explore the bundle-of-
rights theory of property in any detail, or comprehensively to evaluate the HRS 
and its fate in recent years as the Chinese state has sought to facilitate scaled-up, 
more specialised, technologically advanced and productive farming methods. Nor 
does it enter into the debates about the extent to which Chinese agriculture (or 
China more generally) has become capitalist.  It seeks, rather, to argue that the 
HRS shows that individual and social property can indeed be reconciled, not only 
by constructing different property rights structures for different resources – 
private property in some resources, collective (public) property in others, and 
common property in still others – but, as Marx intimated, within property rights 
structures through a fragmentation of the property rights ‘bundle’. In this process, 
we seek to throw light both on the institutional architecture of the HRS as a 
property regime and on the roots of its success, and to highlight the extraordinary 
malleability of property rights structures and the many and varied ways in which 
‘individual property’ and ‘social property’ in the means of production might co-
exist. In doing so, and in the context of what history might show to be a 
Gramscian ‘interregnum’ in which the old is dying but the new has yet to be born 
(1971 [1930], 275-76), we seek also to underline the need to abandon ideas about 
history as an orderly succession of social forms and to highlight the range of 
institutional possibility and importance of bottom-up, as well as top-down, 
experimentation.  
 
The Hegelian roots of Marx’s ideas about property 
Over the last sixty or so years, China’s rural regions have undergone a series of 
transformations in which changes to property rights in and over land have been 
central. Rural China has seen a shift from a regime based largely on private 
property, albeit with feudal remnants, to a fully collectivist regime, to a more 
complex, hybrid regime based on the HRS (Lin, 1990; Meng, 2016).  In the last 
decade there have been further changes which many see as evidence of a capitalist 
transformation of agriculture in China, despite the persistence the HRS (Zhang, 
2015).  The various changes that have occurred, depicted by the Chinese state as 
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advancing ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, have all purportedly been 
carried out in the name of, and under the guidance of, Marxism. But what were 
Marx’s views on property? 
 
It is widely believed that Marx had an irredeemably negative view of property 
and of private property in particular. Shlomo Avineri, for example, argues that 
Marx advocated ‘the abolition of all property relations as such’ (Avineri, 1968, 
p.109).  But this is clearly wrong. Although in the Communist Manifesto Marx 
remarks that ‘the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single 
sentence: the abolition of private property’, he had earlier explained that ‘the 
distinguishing feature of communism is not the abolition of property generally, 
but the abolition of bourgeois property’ (Marx & Engels, 2010c [1848], p.80). It 
has alternatively been argued that Marx advocated the replacement of private 
property by public, state-owned property, a view associated with the belief that 
he adhered firmly to a deterministic ‘stagist’ view of history in which one mode 
of production and, therefore, one property regime is superseded (more or less 
inevitably) by another.  From this perspective, there is a relatively closed list of 
institutional possibilities, each characterised by different property forms - most 
notably, capitalism, characterised by private property and markets, and 
socialism/communism, characterised by state-owned property and central 
planning (Demsetz, 2002).  On closer examination, however, it is clear that 
Marx’s views on property were more complex and nuanced than this.  
 
Although he didn’t analyse property systematically or in detail, and the language 
that he uses changes somewhat over time and is often elusive and enigmatic, his 
writings display considerable consistency of view. First and foremost, as Sean 
Sayers has pointed out, Marx’s analysis of property was ‘characteristically 
Hegelian’, retaining its Hegelian form even in his mature works (Sayers, 2011, 
pp.105-115). Hegel’s account of property drew upon two philosophical traditions: 
natural rights theory and utilitarianism (Hegel, 1991 [1821]). The classic modern 
expression of the former is, of course, that of John Locke for whom property was 
a God-given, natural right arising out of man’s labour and self-ownership. All 
individuals, Locke argued, had a right to ownership over themselves and over 
whatever they had ‘mixed their labour with’. God may have ‘given the world to 
men in common’, but when by means of their labour people removed something 
from its natural state or changed its natural condition (‘put their will into it’), they 
made it their own (Locke, 1988 [1689], chapter 5). By contrast, utilitarian 
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thinkers rejected the notion of natural rights as a philosophical fiction. Property, 
they argued, was a socially created right, a social institution justifiable only when 
(and because) it performed a social purpose, such as promoting economic 
prosperity or individual freedom and autonomy.  Moreover, for people such as 
David Hume and Jeremy Bentham private property was neither universal nor 
‘natural’: property rights varied according to social conditions. For all their 
differences, however, both natural rights theorists and utilitarians tend(ed) to 
operate with an essentially Blackstonian concept of property as ‘sole and despotic 
dominion’, as entailing more or less exclusive ownership rights over things 
(Blackstone, 2016 [1776]. Volume 2).   
 
In drawing on these traditions, Hegel recognised not only the economic and legal 
significance of private property but its ‘spiritual’ role in human life. For Hegel 
private property was central to individual freedom, self-development and 
autonomy (Stillman, 1980).  ‘It is partly in the process of coming to own things 
and to be recognised as their owners’, Plamenatz explains, ‘that human beings 
learn to behave rationally and responsibly’, and to lead ‘an ordered life’. It is 
partly in the ‘process of learning to distinguish mine from thine that the child 
comes to recognise itself as a person, as a bearer of rights and duties, as a member 
of a community with a place of its own inside it’ (Plamenatz, 1975, p.121).  For 
Hegel, therefore, the ‘rational aspect of property’ was to be found ‘not in the 
satisfaction of needs’, but in the ‘superseding of mere subjectivity of personality. 
Not until he has property does the person exist as reason’.  Indeed, his belief in 
the centrality of property to human self-development led Hegel to gesture towards 
the idea that everyone should be guaranteed a basic minimum livelihood, an idea 
taken up by social reformers later in the century (Hegel, 1991 [1821], §41A, 73, 
230, 259–60).   
 
For Hegel, however, although property is essential to human life and is a feature 
of all human societies, it changes its social form over time (Stillman, 1974).  For 
Hegel, private property is not universal but the end point of a progressive and 
teleological historical process. Thus, in the earliest societies property took a 
communal form in which individuals were subsumed within the collective. Over 
time, however, these forms were superseded by private property which enables 
individuals to gain autonomy. For Hegel, modern civil society, based on the 
universal right to private property, represents ‘the fullest development of 
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individuality and liberty’ - the end point of history (Hegel, 1991 [1821], §46, 77-
78, 107).   
 
Marx on the historical development of property 
Marx took from Hegel his historical and dialectical approach to property. Like 
Hegel, he saw property as a universal human phenomenon. ‘All production’, he 
wrote in Grundrisse, ‘is appropriation of nature on the part of an individual within 
and through a specific form of society. In this sense it is a tautology to say that 
property (appropriation) [Eigentum (Aneignen)] is a precondition of 
production …. There can be no production and hence no society where some form 
of property [Form des Eigentums] does not exist …’ (Marx, 1973 [1857-61], 
pp.87-88).  In this context, Marx distinguished possession [Besitz], which was as 
a matter of ‘fact’, from property [Eigentum] which was a matter of right, and in 
the modern world a matter of legal right. 
 
Like Hegel, Marx saw property as taking different forms at different times: all 
forms of property were historical products. Like Hegel, Marx also clearly saw 
property and property rights as important to individual freedom and autonomy, 
in part because they entailed recognition of others. He felt, however, that private 
property generated abstract and estranged forms of autonomy and recognition. It 
represented a right to enjoy and dispose of property without regard to others, and 
was based not on the association of people but on their separation. In that private 
property owners were disposed to refrain from interfering with the property of 
others, they recognised them as ‘others’, but tended to ignore everything else 
about them. Marx sought ‘truly human and social’ property forms which met the 
human need for both autonomy and connectedness (Chitty, 2013). This is not to 
say that Marx did not see the emergence of private property as in certain key 
respects progressive: his attitude towards it was not as relentlessly negative as 
many believe (Ellickson, 1993, pp.1317-18). On the contrary, in Marx’s view, 
private property liberated individual energy and creativity from earlier communal 
constraints. Thus in Capital, in his celebrated account of ‘primitive accumulation’, 
Marx emphasised the positive role of ‘petty’, small scale, individual private 
property in unleashing individual energy and creativity from communal 
constraints and in furthering economic development (Marx, 1961 [1867], Chapter 
32).  For Marx, it also contributed to the development of human potentialities and 
individuality. Thus in Grundrisse one of Marx’s criticisms of the ‘modern world’ 
was that in it ‘production appears as the aim of mankind and wealth as the aim of 
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production’, whereas when the ‘bourgeois form’ was stripped away, what was 
‘wealth other than the universality of human needs, capacities, pleasures, 
productive forces etc …. The absolute working out of [humanity’s] creative 
potentialities’ (Marx, 1973 [1857-61], 488).  For David McLellan, this is 
illustrative of a tension in Marx’s work between, on the one hand, his obvious 
enthusiasm for Enlightenment thought, with its emphasis on rationalism, 
empirical science and material progress; and, on the other, his appreciation of the 
Romantic tradition, with its cultural critique of capitalist industrialisation and the 
erosion of the values of solidarity, co-operation and individual development. 
Marx’s understanding of ‘progress’, McLellan argues, encompassed non-material 
as well as material human development (McLellan, 2015). Indeed, the 
contribution of private property not only to economic development but to the 
development of an enriched and more sensuous ‘free individuality’ seems to have 
contributed both to Marx’s claim that private property had a ‘positive essence’ 
that needed to be retained under communism, and to his later (repeated) assertions 
about the importance of restoring property to the individual worker (Sayers, 2011, 
p.116; Arthur, 2004, p.126). 
 
Where Marx and Hegel differed is that while Hegel saw private property as 
representing the fullest realisation of human freedom and thus as a historical 
endpoint, for Marx private property was the latest, but not final, stage in the 
development of property as a social institution. Indeed, Marx saw private property 
in the means of production not only as a historically specific property form, but 
as a property form which itself passed through a series of different developmental 
stages. Thus the individual form of private property, suitable in a society of small-
scale individual production, was ‘compatible only with a system of production 
and a society moving within narrow limits’: to perpetuate it would be ‘to decree 
universal mediocrity’ (Marx 1961 [1867], pp.713-14). For this reason Marx 
welcomed, at least in certain respects, its supersession by larger ‘capitalist private 
property’ which unleashed unprecedented growth in the productive powers of 
humanity.  It took the ‘pressure of capital to awaken the slumbering powers of 
humanity and promote general industriousness’ (Arthur, 1986, p.37). The 
problem was that although capitalist private property helped to realise human 
capacities and powers, it did so in alienated ways and would eventually impede, 
rather than facilitate, further development of the productive forces and of 
humanity. 
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This led Marx to anticipate the historical supersession of capitalist private 
property in the means of production. However, the precise form he saw property 
taking in his imagined post-capitalist society is less clear. Marx clearly did not, 
as commonly believed, envisage that communism would entail either the 
elimination of all property and property rights or the equalisation of private 
property ownership. He firmly rejected the ‘abstract negation’ of private property, 
arguing that this would entail the negation of the ‘entire world of culture and 
civilization [and] regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and 
undemanding man who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has 
not yet even reached it’ (Marx, 1970 [1844], p.133-34).  Nor did he associate 
‘true’ communism with the replacement of capitalist private property by state-
owned property. On the contrary, Marx dismissed this idea as ‘crude 
communism’, arguing that the transformation of private property in the means of 
production into state-owned or public property merely turned the ‘community’ 
into a ‘universal capitalist’. This ‘crude communism’ remained ‘captive’ and 
‘infected by’ private property (Marx, 1970 [1844], pp.135).  In Marx’s vision, 
communism would see the elimination of ‘bourgeois’ or ‘capitalist’ private 
property in the means of production and its replacement by ‘socialised property’ 
which corresponded to what he saw as the increasingly social character of 
advanced (industrial) production. This entailed the positive supersession, not the 
abstract negation, of private property. Communism would, apparently, retain and 
build upon the ‘positive essence’ of private property, recognising its spiritual and 
ethical value, and ability to unleash human energy and creativity and to foster 
productive development.  
 
It is here, of course, that the confusion begins, because, as we have seen, while 
Marx calls for the creation of ‘truly human and social property’ and for ‘socialised’ 
production and property, he simultaneously calls for the creation of ‘individual 
property’. Communist society, he argues, ‘does not re-establish private property 
[das Privateigentum] for the producer, but gives him individual property [das 
individuelle Eigentum] based on the acquisition of the capitalist era: i.e., on co-
operation and the possession in common [des Gemeinbesitzes] of the land and of 
the means of production’ (Marx, 1961 [1867], p.715).  Indeed, as Sayers observes, 
the restoration of property to the individual worker is a ‘recurrent theme’ in 
Marx’s work (2011, p.116).  Thus when defending the Paris Commune, he argues:  
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The Commune, they exclaim, intends to abolish property, the basis of all 
civilization! Yes, gentlemen, the Commune intended to abolish that class-
property which makes the labour of the many the wealth of the few …. It 
wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of 
production, land and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving exploiting 
labour, into mere instruments of free and associated labour (Marx, 2010a 
[1871], p.213). 
 
On the face of it, Marx’s simultaneous call for ‘individual property’ and for 
‘socialised property’ in the means of production is indeed ‘puzzling’ and ‘curious’ 
(Sayers, 2011, p.115; Arthur, 2004, p.114).  It clearly isn’t a call for a return to 
individual private property in the means of production, but Marx doesn’t 
elaborate on what he means. Can individual and social property be reconciled? 
Eugen Dühring thought not and mocked Marx accordingly. ‘Herr Marx’, he wrote, 
‘remains cheerfully in the nebulous world of his property which is at once both 
individual and social’, leaving it to ‘his adepts to solve for themselves this 
profound dialectical dilemma’. In his view, Marx’s attempt to combine individual 
property with social property was ‘Hegelian verbal jugglery’. Responding to 
Dühring’s criticisms, Engels suggested that Marx was drawing a distinction 
between property in personal possessions, which could be ‘individual’, and 
property in the means of production, which would be ‘socialised’ (quoted in 
Engels, 1962 [1877], chapter XIII). Marx may well have drawn such a distinction, 
but there are compelling reasons for thinking that in this specific context he was 
not doing this. On the contrary, in the relevant passages Marx seems clearly and 
explicitly to be discussing property in the ‘means of production’. ‘I suspect’, 
Arthur writes, ‘that the … means of production are indeed referred to under the 
head of both individual and common property’ (2004, p.114). In the post-
capitalist society envisaged by Marx, ‘individual property’ and ‘socialised 
property’ would, it seems, co-exist. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, commentators have 
struggled to reconcile, let alone put flesh on, these rather enigmatic and 
apparently contradictory ideas (Arthur, 2004, p.114). It is here that the bundles-
of-rights theories of property that have been developed since Marx’s time might 
be of help, providing a way of fleshing out and giving more determinate content 
and meaning to these rather sketchy and seemingly contradictory assertions. 
 
Property theory since Marx: property as a bundle-of-rights 
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At the time that Marx was writing, property was still generally understood in 
Blackstonian terms as the ‘sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of 
any other individual’ (Blackstone, 2016 [1766], Volume 2, chapter 1). The 
prevailing conception of property was, therefore, one in which property was 
generally seen as describing the relationship between a person and a tangible 
physical object and often, indeed, as referring to the physical object (‘thing’) itself.  
 
Gradually, however, the conceptual link between property and tangible things 
loosened. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the development of an 
ever more sophisticated credit system and the emergence and growth of ‘a 
dazzling variety’ of financial wealth in the form of intangible titles to future 
revenue (Horwitz, 1992, p.150). Originally, these titles to revenue (bonds, shares 
and the like) were classified in law as choses in action, as in personam rights, 
personal rights of action which could only be exercised against a particular person 
and which could not, therefore, be assigned. As such, they lacked the qualities of 
property - of the transferable rights in rem which seemingly created direct 
relationships between people and things. Slowly, however, as ever more 
sophisticated markets for them developed and they became ever more easily 
transferred, these revenue rights ‘changed their original character’ and became 
‘very much less like merely personal rights of action and very much more like 
rights of property’ (Holdsworth, 1966 [1937], p.543; see also Ireland, 1996; 
Ireland et al, 1987). The result was that the old conception of property as ‘sole 
and despotic dominion’ over tangible things became increasingly problematic. 
By the end of the century, some of the most important forms of property were 
intangible. In response, the concept of property was gradually re-defined to 
embrace not merely tangible objects but any rights with exchange value. Over 
time, this generated a re-appraisal of the legal nature of property and the 
emergence of the idea that it was a ‘bundle-of-rights’ (Banner, 2011, chapter 3). 
In this respect, the early twentieth century American legal theorist, Wesley 
Hohfeld, was a key figure.  
 
Hohfeld questioned the long established legal dichotomy between rights in rem 
and rights in personam, between property rights (rights to things) and contractual 
and obligatory rights (personal rights against persons). What we loosely refer to 
as ‘rights’, Hohfeld argued, were in fact a number of distinct legal capacities or 
entitlements, which he broke down into a series of dyads: right-duty; privilege-
11 
 
no right; power-liability; immunity-disability. On this basis he developed a 
complex typology of ‘jural opposities’ and ‘jural correlatives’ in which each legal 
capacity of a rights holder was defined by a corresponding non-capacity among 
non-rights holders. Hohfeld then applied this typology to a range of legal relations, 
including the rights in rem which had been traditionally understood as ‘property’ 
rights, arguing that these too were in fact complex bundles of rights, privileges, 
powers and immunities. It followed that, properly conceptualised, property rights 
were not rights to things but were, rather, rights against persons: all rights to and 
over tangible things entailed a duty owed by someone else to the rights-holder 
which the state would enforce. According to Hohfeld, therefore, the traditional 
distinction between rights in rem and rights in personam had been incorrectly 
drawn. In his account, the distinction between them was one not of subject-matter 
but of scope. What distinguished them was the number of persons affected. Rights 
in personam were rights held by someone against one person or a few definite 
persons and were, therefore, ‘paucital’.  Property rights or rights in rem were held 
against the world at large and were, therefore, ‘multital’. It was the extent of the 
jural relations that they entailed that distinguished them, not their association with 
some object of ownership (Hohfeld, 1913, 1917). 
 
Conceptually, this had radical implications, for in blurring the lines between 
rights in rem and rights in personam, Hohfeld also blurred the lines traditionally 
drawn between property and contract. Moreover, it followed from Hohfeld’s 
analysis that rights in rem established not vertical relationships between people 
and things but a series of horizontal relationships among people, in which each 
capacity in the owner's entire bundle of rights imposed a correlative incapacity 
on non-owners. Property didn’t describe any res, any physical object at all; it was 
simply a bundle of legal entitlements and relations (Hohfeld, 1913, 1917). 
Property rights were, therefore, at root, social relations, a myriad of legally 
constituted, personal rights between individuals underwritten by the state. This 
idea remains widely held amongst lawyers (Singer, 2000). It also, of course, 
echoes Marx’s insistence that both capital and property are not things but social 
relations. For Marx the Lockean idea that the development of private property 
under capitalism was the result of an individual will asserted over things was a 
‘juridical illusion’ (Sayers, 2011, p.111).  
 
In the legal world, Hohfeld’s work has also come to be associated with the idea 
that property is composed not of a single right over a thing but of a ‘bundle-of-
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rights’ held against other people; that it is a complex compound of Hohfeldian 
relations. In the 1960s, the Oxford legal theorist, A M Honoré, adopted a similar 
approach to analyse the concept of ‘ownership’, disaggregating the eleven 
‘standard incidents of ownership’: the rights to possess, to use, to manage, to the 
income, to the capital, to security, to transmit/alienate, and so on. Something 
resembling Blackstone’s ‘sole and despotic dominion’ occurs only when (more 
or less) all eleven sticks, (more or less) undivided and unabridged, are bound 
together in a state of ‘full liberal’ or ‘individual ownership’. In reality, as Honoré 
and many others before and since have pointed out, there are nearly always 
restrictions on the length of some of the metaphorical sticks in the bundle: the 
right to use, for example, is commonly subject to legal constraints. In other cases, 
some of the sticks possessed by a rights holder are missing altogether; in still 
others, ownership is split and the sticks (or even the rights deriving from a single 
stick) divided between different persons, with the result that there are multiple 
persons with separate ‘proprietorial’ entitlements to the same object of property. 
The possibilities are endless, reflecting the enormous complexity of actual 
property entitlements in law. As Honoré observed, use of the terms ‘owner’ and 
‘ownership’ is often ‘extend[ed] to cases in which not all the [standard] incidents 
are present’. This, he suggests, is reasonable when enough of the rights in the full 
liberal ownership bundle have been joined, but there comes a point where the 
bundle is so attenuated they simply aren’t meaningful or appropriate descriptors 
(Honoré, 1961). 
  
Although the ‘bundle-of-rights’ view of property has become something of an 
orthodoxy amongst legal scholars and theorists, it is not without its critics. It not 
only underlines the intricate, contingent, eminently changeable nature of property 
and property rights, and their inherently social relational nature, but reminds us 
of the blurry lines dividing property and contract/obligation (Worthington, 2007). 
It also highlights that ‘property in physical, finite, non-shareable resources is 
inherently rivalrous’: extending property rights and protection to one person 
inevitably means denying the same rights to others (Underkuffler, 1996, 2015). 
In other words, bundle-of-rights theories underline the fact that property rights 
are contestable legal and political constructs which can be constituted in many 
different ways with different effects and consequences. Understandably, this 
discomforts some supporters of contemporary neoliberal capitalism who would 
like to see more things ‘privatized’ and the adoption of a stronger, more 
‘essentialist’, unitary conception of property as (more or less) exclusive and 
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exclusionary possession of all eleven of Honoré’s incidents, subject to minimal 
restrictions and state regulation. This has led some to reassert an idea of property 
as ‘the law of things’ (Smith, 2012; Merrill & Smith, 2001). 
 
Marx’s insistence that capital is a social relation and his observation in 
Grundrisse that the concept of private property ‘presupposes an antithetical form, 
non-property’ have clear Hohfeldian overtones (Marx, 1973 [1857-61], pp.87-88; 
see also Cui, 1998, p.77). Crucially, by highlighting the many different ways 
property rights in the means of production can be constructed and allocated, 
bundle-of-rights theories suggest that it might indeed be possible to construct 
property rights structures which combine notions of ‘individual property’ with 
notions of ‘socialised property’. Thus, as we have seen, Marx deployed a number 
of different concepts when he was writing about property. Many of these are 
present in Chapter 32 of Capital: ‘individual private property’; capitalist’ or 
‘capitalistic private property’; ‘individual property’; ‘socialised property’. When 
Marx refers to ‘individual private property’ and ‘capitalist private property’, he  
seems to be deploying a Blackstonian conception of property as ‘sole and 
despotic dominion’ - the possession by individuals or productive entities of 
something close to Honoré’s full liberal ownership rights in the means of 
production. In similar vein, his rejection of ‘crude communism’ is rooted in his 
opposition to full liberal (private property) ownership by the state. The 
transformation of private ownership into state ownership, he suggests, merely 
turns the ‘community’ into a ‘universal capitalist’ and achieves only a partial and 
abstract negation of private property. It merely changes the identity of the full 
liberal owner; it still entails property-less workers (Marx, 1961, chapter 32). This 
opposition to the possession of full liberal ownership rights in the means of 
production, whether by capitalists or the state, does not, however, represent 
opposition to all property and property rights, merely opposition to particular 
property rights structures.  
 
What the bundles-of-rights conception of property makes clear is that there is no 
reason why property regimes have to be based on full liberal ownership of the 
means of production; why all the rights in the property bundle have to be 
concentrated, undiluted, in one person or entity. As Honoré shows, the various 
sticks in the bundle can not only be shortened and restricted, but split and 
allocated to different persons. Some of these ‘persons’ might be individual human 
beings, some of them collective or corporate bodies. In this sense, therefore, it is 
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perfectly possible to create ‘individual property’ alongside ‘socialized property’; 
to create individual property rights within a broadly social or collectivist property 
framework. It is also, of course, perfectly possible to have social formations with 
a range of different property regimes for different resources.  
 
The Joint stock company and the ‘dissolution of the atom of property’ 
Indeed, Marx clearly thought that there were already forces at work within 
capitalism that were splitting ownership in the means of production. He lived long 
enough to witness the early stages of the processes whereby economies 
dominated by a large number of small, family-owned firms were replaced by 
economies dominated by a small number of large, impersonal joint stock 
companies (JSCs), the precursors to today’s large public corporations. In JSCs, 
Marx argued, the means of production cease to take the form of individual private 
property: ‘private capital’ is replaced by ‘social capital (the capital of directly 
associated individuals)’. JSCs thus take the form of ‘social undertakings’ rather 
than ‘private undertakings’. This is reflected, inter alia, in the changing nature 
and status of JSC shareholding. In the JSC, he wrote, ‘the actually functioning 
capitalist’ is ‘transform[ed] ... into a mere manager, [an] administrator of other 
people’s capital’ and ‘the owner of capital’ transformed into ‘a mere owner, a 
mere money-capitalist’, who received a return in the form (if not at the level) of 
interest, ‘as mere compensation for owning capital’. For Marx, JSCs marked the 
‘abolition of capital as private property’ and the ‘abolition of the capitalist mode 
of production within the capitalist mode of production itself’. Although they 
didn’t represent the actual socialisation of production, they were a ‘necessary 
point of transition towards the transformation of capital back into the property of 
the producers’, though ‘no longer as the private property of individual producers 
but rather as their property as associated producers, as directly social property’ 
(Marx, 1971 [1894], pp.435-441).  
 
Half a century later Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means described the same 
processes, arguing that the rise of the joint stock corporation had dissolved the 
‘atom of property’ (Berle & Means, 1968 [1932], p.8). By then, JSCs had grown 
in number and size, a sophisticated market for their shares had developed, and 
‘the company’ as a separate legal entity, rather than the shareholders, had come 
to be seen as the owner of the tangible assets. Shareholders now owned shares, 
quite separate pieces of intangible property in the form of rights to profit. They 
had, moreover, relinquished most of the rights traditionally associated with 
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‘ownership’ to managers. For Berle and Means, these changes had ‘dissolved the 
property atom’ and ‘destroy[ed] the very foundations on which the economic 
order of the past three centuries ha[d] rested’. For Adam Smith and his followers, 
they argued, ‘private property was a unity’, involving, amongst other things, 
possession. The JSC had dissolved that unity; the various rights in the (full liberal) 
ownership bundle now ‘attach[ed] to different individuals’ and with this ‘private 
property in the instruments of production [had] disappear[ed]’. There were now 
two forms of ‘property’, one active – the rights over the tangible assets owned by 
the corporation; the other passive - the shares, the attenuated bundle of rights held 
by the shareholders. Having relinquished most of the rights in the ‘ownership’ 
bundle, shareholders looked less like ‘owners’ and more like creditors; and the 
modern corporation looked less like a private enterprise and more like a social or 
quasi-social institution (Berle & Means, 1968 [1932], pp.8-9, 303-313).  
 
In ‘bundles-of-rights’ terms, in JSCs the rights making up (full liberal) ownership 
of the means of production have been split and re-distributed, with only a few of 
them remaining in the hands of shareholders. Shareholders – money capitalist 
rentiers whose interest is almost always entirely financial – have retained their 
residual control rights and their right to the corporate surpluses, but given up most 
of the other rights traditionally associated with ‘ownership’ (Ireland, 1999). 
Although the language he uses is different, Marx’s comments reflect an intuitive 
grasp of these processes. Indeed, in the decades before and after the Second 
World War, with shareholders dispersed and relatively disempowered and labour 
relatively strong, there was reason for believing that the rise of the JSC was, as 
Marx predicted, slowly generating more ‘socialised’ forms of production. 
However, the rights structures themselves were never socialised: despite their 
creditor-like character, shareholders retained their exclusive control rights. This 
has proved significant, for in recent decades, having re-concentrated in 
institutions, previously-dispersed shareholders, operating in financial markets, 
have been able to use their residual control rights to reassert their power in and 
over corporations (Ireland, 2009, 2016). 
 
Splitting ownership: the Chinese Household Responsibility System 
As Honoré observed, examples of splitting the ‘property atom’ abound in 
empirical reality: property rights can be, and often are, disaggregated (Singer, 
2000). At one level, therefore, the household responsibility system (HRS) is just 
another example of a widespread phenomenon. It is, however, not only an 
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unusually complex and radical one, not least because of its collective dimensions, 
but one which has been remarkably successful in restoring dignity and autonomy 
to rural households and in generating growth and alleviating poverty – despite 
flagrantly violating the precepts for successful development laid down by many 
modern (neoliberal) theorists and policymakers (North, 2005). 
 
Some locate the origins of the HRS as far back as the mid-late 1950s (Zhang, 
2010), but the rise of the HRS in its modern form is usually traced back to a grass-
roots ‘practical experiment’ in Anhui Province in the late 1970s (Wu, 2016, p.1), 
which was embraced by local officials and then, in 1981, by Deng Xiao Ping and 
the central state. It is estimated that by the mid-1980s the HRS encompassed 
about 95% of Chinese households. Its rise coincided with dramatic increases in 
agricultural output and equally dramatic improvements to the livelihoods of 
millions of Chinese farmers: between 1979 and 1984, rural net income per capita 
grew by 11% annually (Wong, 2014, pp.14-15). What made the HRS so effective? 
We aren’t able here to analyse the HRS in detail (see Meng, 2016b), but using 
Honoré’s eleven incidents of ownership as an analytical aid, it is possible to 
identify its key features and the roots of its success. 
 
China has adopted a ‘unique dual-track land ownership system’ which establishes 
different property rights regimes in urban and rural land. Under Articles 9 and 10 
of the 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic urban land (land in cities) is 
owned by the state, while rural and suburban land is owned by regional and local 
collectives. This differentiation has survived four revisions of the Constitution (in 
1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004) and has been confirmed by other laws such as the 
Land Administrative Law (1986), the Revised Land Administrative Law (1999) 
and the Property Rights Law (2007). Under the HRS, however, a two-tier 
property rights structure has been enshrined in which some of the rights in rural 
land ownership bundle are vested in collective bodies, thereby retaining key 
elements of ‘socialist public ownership’, while others are vested in individual 
peasant households. Crucially, under the HRS the rights to possess, use and 
manage are held by peasant farmers, albeit on a time-limited basis and subject to 
a state-imposed restriction dictating that rural land must be used for agricultural 
purposes. Initially, these use-rights were allocated for a period of five years, but 
this was extended to 15 years in 1984 and to 30 years in 1993 (Zhu & Jiang, 1991, 
p. 446; Cheng & Tang, 1995/1996, p.44). Both the Land Administration Law 
(1999) and the Rural Contract Law (2003) have confirmed the duration of rural 
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land leases as 30 years, as did the Property Law of 2007. In Honoré’s terms, the 
Chinese legal system provides peasants with ‘determinate interests’. When their 
leases terminate, the rights revert once more to the collective, which can re-
allocate them, either to the previous tenant or to other members of the village. 
The allocation to households of the right to manage – the right to ‘decide how 
and by whom the thing owned shall be used’ - has been particularly significant, 
for it has enabled peasants to make their own decisions about production and land 
use management, and to adjust their crop patterns in response to soil, temperature, 
rainfall and other region-specific differences (Lardy, 1983). More controversial 
has been the illegal development of rural land for non-agricultural uses such as 
house-building. This has led to the emergence of so-called ‘small’ or ‘minor’ 
property rights, valuable but of uncertain legal status (Qiao, 2015).  
 
The HRS also gives households what Honoré calls income rights, a concept which 
encompasses the ‘fruits, rents, profits’ and other benefits derived from the right 
to use. Under Maoist collectivization, the basic production and accounting unit 
was the production team and distribution was not directly linked to work 
performance. By contrast, under the HRS households are allocated income rights. 
Initially, they were split with the collective, with households returning a specified 
percentage of their output back to the collective but retaining any output (or the 
proceeds from it) exceeding this quota. In 1994, however, the quota requirement 
was abolished and the right to income vested entirely in individual producers, 
who are now entitled to any benefits (income, rents, profits etc.) derived from the 
use rights they possess once they have met their obligations to the state and the 
collective (agricultural taxes, village community charges etc) (Zhu & Jiang, 1993; 
Qi, 1999, p.20). Some see this as one of the springboards of Chinese rural 
economic growth. It has certainly ‘greatly benefited rural families’ (Joel, 2012, 
p.134): even if they decide to sublet their land, rent-receiving households are 
usually able to avoid complete poverty and destitution when they suffer 
temporary or long-term job loss as migrant workers (Zhang & Donaldson, 2013, 
p.270). 
 
Households have also acquired ‘transmissibility’ rights, the ability to bequeath 
their interests to successors. Thus, the time-limited rights of use, possession, 
management and income held by peasants can be inherited by their successors, 
though only for the duration of the contract period. Peasants have also begun 
gradually to acquire rights to transfer their use-rights. In 1988 constitutional 
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revisions confirmed that land use rights could “transferred according to law’, and 
article 128 of the Property Law (2007) formally permits subcontracting, although 
this power remains subject to important constraints: under the rules of the Rural 
Contracting Law (2003) the transfer must be ‘a voluntary, consultative and paid 
lease’, the land must still be used for agricultural purposes, and the terms of lease 
must not exceed 30 years. As the periods over which use-rights are granted to 
households have lengthened, these rights of transmission have become 
increasingly important and valuable.  
 
Households have not, however, been allocated Honoré’s right to the capital – ‘the 
power to alienate the thing and the liberty to consume, waste, or destroy the whole 
or part of it’. In China not only is there an obligation to use land ‘rationally’ 
(which would seem to exclude the liberty to destroy), the right to sell and alienate 
is unambiguously in the hands of collective bodies (Hodgson & Huang, 2013, p. 
611). Under Article 10 of the 2004 Constitution, ‘no organization or individual 
may appropriate, buy, sell, or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful 
means’, and according to the NPC Legal Affairs Work Committee, the right to 
the proceeds from the sale of land ‘belongs to the central people’s government 
and … the State Council may decide the distribution of profits from state-owned 
land’ (RFGW, 1998). 
 
The household’s right to security - the right to be ‘able to look forward to 
remaining owner indefinitely’ - is also curtailed. As in most property regimes, the 
Chinese state can expropriate land in order to construct roads, railways and the 
like, as long as it follows certain procedures and provides ‘reasonable 
compensation’ and ‘appropriate resettlement’ (Wong, 2014, p.21).  The state can 
also convert rural land into urban land. As Honoré says, in principle, ‘a general 
right to security, availing against others, is perfectly consistent with the existence 
of a power to expropriate or divest in the state or public authorities’. In this sense, 
‘ownership has never been absolute’; it has always had ‘a social aspect’, usually 
‘expressed in … the prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution for debt, to 
taxation, and to expropriation by the public authority’ (Honoré, 1961, pp.120, 
145-46). In China, however, questions have arisen about the way in which land 
expropriations are conducted. There have been numerous incidents of fraud and 
abuse in which Chinese peasants have been denied fair compensation: there is a 
gap between the law-in-the-books and the law-in-practice, between the practical 
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operation of the legal system and the formal rights structures (Wong, 2014; 
Hodgson & Huang, 2013)..   
 
Under the HRS, then, within a framework in which key land ownership rights 
remain vested in collectives, many of the rights associated with ownership – the 
right to use, to possess, to manage, to the income and so on – have been allocated 
to individual households for specified time periods and subject to various 
restrictions. When the various time-limited rights awarded to households 
terminate, they revert to the collective, which retains what Honoré calls a 
‘residuary right in the things owned’. This is significant not least because many 
see the possessors of these residual rights as the ‘owners’, hence the continuing 
depiction in China of collectives as ‘landowners’. In Honoré’s terms, however, 
the HRS is an example of ‘split ownership’ in which the eleven standard incidents 
are divided and sub-divided between individual households and collectives, and 
where the ‘ultimate residuary right is not coupled with present alienability or with 
the other standard incidents’. This renders the ‘location of ownership’ a ‘puzzle’. 
Indeed, as Qiao and Upham suggest, asking ‘who owns China’s land’ is actually 
rather unhelpful and misleading (Qiao & Upham, 2015, p.2495). 
 
Crucially, the HRS is widely credited with generating huge increases in 
agricultural productivity. By separating and dividing the rights in the ownership 
bundle and allocating, with restrictions, key ownership rights to individual 
farming households, the HRS has provided individual farmers with incentives to 
increase productivity within a broad framework of collective land ‘ownership’ 
(Kung, 2002). Indeed, it was precisely the HRS’s startling success in this regard 
- as well as its enhancement of individual autonomy and dignity – that led the 
Chinese leadership to embrace and preserve it. In 2007, after a lengthy and heated 
thirteen year debate, the Chinese state endorsed the HRS in its first 
comprehensive Property Law, despite being placed under intense pressure – both 
from within and without - to privatize rural land and adopt a system of full liberal 
land ownership (Wong, 2014, pp.19-22). 
 
None of this is to say that the HRS does not have limitations. Quite apart from 
the problem of unjust expropriations, it threatens to perpetuate small-scale 
production and to discourage long-term investments by producers (Zhu & Jiang, 
1993). The lengthening of the use-rights allocations to households to thirty years 
and relaxation of the rules on transfers by households were responses to these 
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problems, reminding us that property rights structures can be subjected to regular 
review. Indeed, in China official changes to legal rights often follow de facto, 
‘on-the-ground’ changes in actual practices. This has been apparent in the 
emergence of  what have been called ‘small’ or ‘minor’ property rights of 
uncertain legal status (Qiao & Upham, 2015, pp.2487-89), particularly in the 
context of urban housing (Kan 2012). Nor is any of this to say that the HRS 
doesn’t contain anti-collectivist tendencies, which some would like to encourage 
and others to contain. What it is to say is that the HRS highlights the complexity 
of property and property rights structures and the range of possibility: the choice 
is not simply between alternative systems of full liberal ownership, whether 
private or public. It is possible to devise property rights structures that reconcile, 
in Various ways, the individual and the social – Hegel’s the universal and the 
particular (Chitty, 2009) – and to construct structures that retain the ‘positive 
essence’ of private property within a broadly collectivist framework. 
 
The changing nature of the HRS 
The introduction of the HRS was criticised from across the political spectrum, 
but building on the often under-appreciated foundations created by Maoist 
collectivism (Lin, 2013, p.46-48; Xu, 2013, 2015), its empowerment of peasant 
producers and the incentives it created are now widely credited with helping to 
bring hundreds of millions of poor farmers out of poverty and generating ‘the 
fastest rate of rural poverty reduction in human history’ (Donaldson & Zhang, 
2015, p.52). However, it not only marked a shift away from collectivism and 
planning towards a more market-oriented system, it re-directed Chinese 
agriculture back towards more small-scale, household-based production. By the 
mid-1990s the Chinese government was trying to modernise and up-scale 
production beyond the boundaries of the household. This had been anticipated by 
Deng Xaioping when he argued that the development of Chinese agriculture was 
going to require ‘two great leaps’. The first involved the dismantling of the 
peoples’ communes and introduction of the HRS - ‘a great advance which should 
be kept in the long term’; the second involved ‘meeting the needs of scientific 
agriculture and socialized production’, and ‘properly developing scaled-up 
operation’. This, Deng noted, would require ‘collectivising the rural economy and 
coordinating agricultural modernisation’, something which would be ‘impossible’ 
if each household carried on working on its own (Donaldson & Zhang, 2015, 
p.54). 
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As Donaldson and Zhang observe, the two leaps seem to involve moving in 
different directions: de-collectivisation ‘sets agriculture back to household-based, 
small-holding operations’; re-collectivisation and scaling-up involve moving 
‘beyond the household boundaries’ (Donaldson & Zhang, 2015, p.54). Moreover, 
the second stage seems to demand not only investment in new technologies but 
an enhanced division of labour, greater productive specialisation, and a move 
from production oriented primarily towards subsistence (with only the surplus 
product being marketed) to specialised production oriented primarily towards 
exchange. This creates a series of challenges. Societies seeking to build positively 
on the technological achievements of capitalism and the division of labour have 
to develop not only property rights regimes that reconcile the individual and the 
social, but organisational forms, ways of investing in modern technologies, 
mechanisms for up-scaling and co-ordinating the operations of specialised 
productive units, and for exchanging and distributing goods (and surpluses) 
which do likewise.  
 
We do not have the space here to discuss in any detail the developments that have 
taken place in Chinese agriculture in recent years. It is clear, however, that 
different institutional approaches to modernisation and up-scaling, and to vertical 
integration and co-ordination were available to, and at different times promoted 
by, the Chinese state. Choices had to be made between collective and private 
modes of investment; between different ways of achieving vertical integration; 
between different forms of collective control and oversight; between ‘dragon-
head’ agribusiness producers, independent household producers and co-
operatives (which can themselves take many different forms); and between 
planning and ‘free’ market co-ordination and variants thereof. In recent years the 
Chinese state has actively promoted institutional routes and arrangements that 
have facilitated the penetration of capital into the Chinese countryside and 
fostered the emergence of ever greater market co-ordination. It has shifted its 
support from peasants to agribusiness, encouraged commercial companies to get 
directly involved in farming, sought to develop corporate supply chains, and 
facilitated contract farming and land transfers to create larger farms (Against the 
Grain, Oct 2015). 
 
It didn’t have to be this way: different institutional arrangements could have been 
encouraged and fostered. The Chinese state has favoured these particular routes 
because of a changed approach to food security (moving away from self-
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sufficiency), a prioritization above all else of rapid growth and, in some quarters, 
a belief that Chinese agriculture had, as a matter of historical necessity, to pass 
through capitalism to get to socialism. Whatever the reasons, there is no doubt 
that agriculture has emerged as an important new site for profit making and 
capital accumulation and that the changes have contributed to growing 
commodification, to new forms of inequality and class stratification, to the 
emergence of what some have called a ‘semi-proletarian’ workforce, and to the 
private appropriation of surpluses (Gurel, 2014). It is, therefore, easy to see why 
some commentators are arguing that Chinese agriculture is either already 
predominantly capitalist in nature or rapidly being ‘subsumed by capitalism’ 
(Chuang, 2015). However, the changes which have occurred have not yet 
generated ‘pure’ capitalist relations or a ‘purely’ capitalist dynamic. There 
remains considerable institutional complexity, ‘many different local models’, a 
‘multiplicity of local patterns’ and a variety of economic and social dynamics and 
trajectories (Zhang, 2013; see also Gurel, 2014, p.70). Many, like Zhang, see 
these as ‘modes of an agrarian transition’ to capitalism, though he is anxious to 
stress that they are not different stages in the same developmental trajectory 
towards a uniform capitalist agriculture’ (Zhang, 2013, p.10). Others, however, 
see these complexities as evidence that China has not (yet) ‘taken the capitalist 
road’, though they are well aware that there are pressures, internal and external, 
pushing in that direction (Amin, 2013; see also Cui, 1998). 
 
One of the major barriers to the emergence of a fully-fledged capitalist dynamic 
is, of course, the persistence of household land-use rights. While these have not 
prevented the penetration of capital into agricultural production, not least through 
the mechanisms of credit and trade, they have acted as a brake on the emergence 
of a mass of completely property-less wage labourers and the development of a 
fully capitalist dynamic. Moreover, they have been consistently endorsed by the 
Chinese state and supported by the peasantry. So, while there is no doubt that the 
Chinese government has been actively facilitating and promoting the transfer of 
land-use rights by encouraging the specialised, vertically integrated production 
of export commodities and by entering free trade and investment agreements 
which oblige the removal of barriers to foreign investment – and while there is 
no doubt that these use rights are now increasingly being transferred to corporate 
entities, a development which has recently being accelerated by the emergence of 
land circulation trusts (Against the Grain, April 2015) - land is still not yet fully 
privatized and commodified (Ye, 2015; Amin, 2013). The persistence of land use 
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rights has restricted the ability of agribusiness companies completely to 
dispossess farmers of their access to land and provided farmers with a source of 
income and bargaining power. Moreover, some commentators continue 
vigorously to defend the system of ‘collective land ownership and individualized 
land use rights’, arguing that it has not only ‘protect[ed] agricultural producers to 
various degrees against the domination, exploitation and dispossession by outside 
capital’, but shown itself to be ‘adaptable [and] conducive to development of rural 
markets and agricultural modernisation’. It has, they argue, simultaneously 
allowed land rental markets rapidly to develop, facilitating the ‘circulation of land 
and consolidation of parcellized land into larger operations’, and has helped 
agricultural modernization in China to proceed in more equitable ways than 
elsewhere, notwithstanding the growing encroachments of capital. China does not 
yet have an expanding army of landless vagabonds (Donaldson & Zhang, 2015 
pp.68-71; Huang et al, 2012). The result has been the emergence of complex and 
varying institutional arrangements with different sets of ‘rules of reproduction’ 
for producers (Brenner, 1986). This underpins the difficulties commentators 
encounter trying to fit contemporary Chinese agriculture unequivocally and 
decisively into the ‘capitalist’ category, though that may be its direction of travel. 
The Chinese experience vividly illustrates that different institutional 
arrangements – different property rights structures, productive institutions, and 
modes of investment and co-ordination - generate different economic and social 
dynamics, different values and mentalities, and different sorts of conflicts (Gurel, 
2014).  
 
Making History  
In many ways, as various commentators have observed, having defeated much of 
the opposition, capital(ism) is now overdosing on itself. Polanyi’s ‘fictitious 
commodities’ – labour, land and money – have increasingly become subsumed 
under Marx’s logic of capital accumulation and, with the erosion of the 
institutional safeguards protecting them from the full effects of commodification, 
have all become crisis zones. Accumulation seems to be reaching its limits, and 
there are few signs that our elites and technicians know how to get the system 
functioning smoothly again – economically, politically or socially. This has led 
Streeck to argue that we need to see capitalism ‘as a historical phenomenon, one 
that has not just a beginning, but also an end’, and to recognise that this end ‘is 
already under way’. We also, he says, need to shed the ‘prejudice that ‘capitalism 
as a historical epoch will end only when a new, better society is in sight’, and to 
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learn ‘to think about capitalism coming to an end without assuming responsibility 
for answering the question of what one proposes to put in its place’.  It is not the 
job of social scientists ‘to make people feel good … [but] to speak the truth’ 
(Streeck, 2015). One key truth that needs to be spoken is that the range of 
institutional possibility is far greater than that between a more or less ‘pure’ 
capitalism - a (neoliberal) regime based on full liberal ownership of the means of 
production by private individuals or entities and generalised and open markets - 
and socialism or communism, understood (as it usually is) as a regime 
characterised by full liberal ownership of the means of production by the state 
coupled with central planning (Unger, 2009).  With this in mind, it is worth 
returning to the Marx puzzle and his enigmatic comments about property in a 
post-capitalist society. 
 
As we have seen, Marx believed that that the appropriation (Aneignen) of nature 
and therefore ‘property (das Eigentum)’ was ‘a precondition of production’. 
There could, he argued, be ‘no production and hence no society where some form 
of property (Form des Eigentums) d[id] not exist’ (Marx, 1973 [1857-61], pp.87-
88).  In the conceptual universe of modern property theory, all societies have to 
delineate and allocate the rights in the property bundle over different resources. 
In his imagined post-capitalist society, Marx envisaged a property regime in 
which ‘individual’ and ‘social’ property rights in the means of production would 
co-exist. Although he did not elaborate on what such a regime might look like, 
let alone provide a detailed institutional picture, he was pretty explicit about the 
features of capitalism that needed to be overcome: production governed by the 
law of value, alienation, and exploitation and oppression. For Marx, the law of 
value was specific to capitalism and operated only when all inputs and outputs 
had been commodified and monetized, subjecting production to market forces 
(including the need to exploit labour) which confronted producers as ‘external 
coercive laws’ (Weeks, 1982). He wanted a decisive break with such a world, in 
which the products of human activity confronted people as inexorable non-human 
forces. He was, therefore, vehemently opposed to capitalist markets, to what 
Ellen Wood calls ‘the market as imperative’. His views of what she calls the 
‘market as opportunity’ are less clear, though he was aware that, historically, not 
all markets were capitalist. What he sought was the construction of a world in 
which people exercised conscious mastery over the institutions within which they 
lived their lives. He thus envisaged a world in which they were engaged in a 
process of self-making, in which social relations were transparent, participatory 
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and democratic, and in which human beings were able fully to exploit the 
productive technologies they had created in furtherance of human freedom and 
potential. While these aspirations did not provide him with a blueprint, they did 
provide a set of guiding principles.  
 
As Kevin Anderson and others have pointed out, Marx gradually developed a 
much more contingent sense of historical unfolding, moving away from the rather 
(uni)linear, teleological, staged, deterministic and Eurocentric view of historical 
development that coloured his earlier work. He began instead to develop ‘a 
multilinear and non-reductionist theory of history’, analysing the ‘complexities 
and differences of non-Western societies’ and ‘refus[ing] to bind himself to a 
single model of development or revolution’ (Anderson, 2014, p.237). In the last 
French and German editions of Capital that he edited, and in later correspondence, 
Marx asserted that the transition outlined in the chapters on primitive 
accumulation applied only to Western Europe, opening up what Anderson calls 
‘multilinear pathways of social development’(Anderson, 2014, p.241). He no 
longer, for example, seems to have considered the capitalist privatization of 
communal land a pre-requisite of progress towards socialism/communism, 
revising his earlier view that the destruction of peasant communes by capitalism 
was progressive, and coming to see Russian peasant communal landownership as 
a possible ‘point of departure for a communist development’ (Anderson, 2014, 
p.235). The implication was that capitalism might not be a necessary stage for the 
development of socialism.  
 
The greater openness of the later Marx’s vision of the future accounts in part for 
his unwillingness to produce anything resembling a detailed picture of what a 
post-capitalist society would look like. As Hudis says, he provided ‘little or no 
discussion of the institutional forms’ of a post-capitalist society, other than to 
speak positively about workers co-operatives and ‘free association’ (Hudis, 2013, 
pp.114, 177, 190; see also Berki, 1983, p.15). This is reflected in the many 
different descriptors he attached to post-capitalist society: ‘socialism’, 
‘communism’, ‘mode of production of associated producers’, society of ‘free 
individuality’ and so on (see Hudis, 2013, pp.114,177,190). Indeed, not only was 
he steadfast in his refusal to engage in detailed talk about the future, he was highly 
critical of visions which emerged not from the material possibilities of the present 
but from the heads of theoreticians (Hudis, 2013, p.84).  
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In this context, as many have observed, the Paris Commune, short-lived though 
it was, seems to have played ‘a pivotal role’, re-shaping some of Marx’s ideas 
and altering the trajectory of his thought (Ross, 2016, pp.77-89); see also Harvey, 
2000, pp.174-77). Amongst other things, it led him to argue that ‘the working 
class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for 
its own purposes’ (2010a [1871], p.206). This seems to have been a reflection of 
his growing recognition that social transformation was unlikely successfully to 
be realised by a top-down statist imposition of a theoretically-derived, 
predetermined set of institutions. ‘The working class’, he wrote, ‘did not expect 
miracles from the Commune [and had] no ready-made utopias to introduce par 
décret du people’. They knew ‘that in order to work out their own 
emancipation … they w[ould] have to pass through long struggles, through a 
series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men’ (2010a [1871], 
p.213). As he had argued in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, the 
resolution of the theoretical antitheses between such things as ‘lack of property 
and property’ was ‘only possible in a practical way’. It was ‘by no means merely 
a problem of understanding, but a real problem of life’ to be resolved in practice 
(1970 [1844]). What most impressed him about the Commune was precisely ‘its 
own working existence’ (2010a [1871], pp.217, 252, 261). This implies that the 
institutional structures of post-capitalist societies are likely to emerge in 
significant part from the engagements of ordinary people with existing 
institutions and practices, and from practical experimentation with alternatives 
(Unger, 1987; Cui, 1998). Inevitably, this makes it very difficult to put detailed 
institutional flesh on any post-capitalist vision. The emphasis is, rather, on people 
‘making history’, one step at a time. 
 
And that, of course, was precisely what members of the Chinese peasantry were 
doing when, in search of practical solutions to real-world problems, they devised 
the HRS, a set of institutional arrangements it is hard to imagine being conceived 
by theorists. Indeed, many still see this instance of imaginative agency as an 
anomalous, impure muddle. But it has proved itself in reality, working well at 
both the material and spiritual levels. Having begun life as a grass-roots 
experiment by a group of 20 or so households seeking to resolve practical 
problems - and doing so collectively rather than as isolated individuals operating 
in impersonal markets – the HRS evolved in both a bottom-up and a top-down 
way. The property regime devised by these households was endorsed by local 
officials and eventually embraced and promoted by the central state as national 
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policy. Its rise was, therefore, the result of a series of complex interactions 
between peasants, local collective agencies and the central authorities. Indeed, its 
success underlines the importance of recognising that state, law and ‘experts’ are 
not the only engines of property rights reform and that legal development 
sometimes follows social practice (Qiao & Upham, 2015, 2487-89). It also shows 
that it is possible to reconcile the decentralization implied by ‘free association’ 
and ‘individual property’ in the means of production with the collective planning 
that seems to be demanded by the development of the forces of production and 
growing division of labour. This is significant, for in a world with ever more 
robots and automation, and greater abundance from less work, a certain amount 
of collective planning seems inevitable if labour and resources are to be allocated 
in a way that meets human needs and prevents social and political disintegration. 
  
Some Concluding Reflections  
There may be other important lessons here. Truly radical change is likely to 
generate social practices and arrangements that are so different from our own that 
they are not only hard to imagine but incapable of being captured by existing 
conceptual categories. ‘Since we can speak of what transcends the present only 
in the language of the present’, Terry Eagleton explains, ‘we risk cancelling out 
our imaginings in the very act of articulating them. The only real otherness would 
be that which we could not articulate at all’ (Eagleton, 2000, p.53). Or as Unger 
puts it, we are permanently in danger of being ‘helpless puppets of the 
institutional and imaginative worlds we inhabit’ (Unger DH 204). This is the 
problem that confronts those who, like Marx, try both to emphasise how different 
the future could (will) be while at the same time trying to provide some idea of 
what a post-capitalist society and its property relations might (or ought to) look 
like. Indeed Berki goes as far as to suggest that perhaps ‘Marx actually wanted to 
convey the message that communism was essentially unintelligible’; that it 
simply couldn’t ‘be adequately captured in terms of existing language’ (1983, 
p.17).  
 
But, as David Harvey says, those seeking transformative change can’t really do 
without some vision, however incomplete and partial, of the sort of alternative 
form of social life they would like to establish, if only to clarify the desired 
direction of travel (Harvey, 2000, p.188). And constrained though he was by the 
categories and language of his time and the problem of inexpressibility, Marx 
offered not only some guiding principles but some ‘visionary pronouncements 
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concerning the different quality of communist society’ which he cast in 
‘extremely vivid, evocative language’ (Berki, 1983, p.15). In The Critique of the 
Gotha Program, for example, he imagines ‘the higher phase of communist 
society’, in which the division of labour and its subordination of the individual 
has been transcended; in which the development of the productive forces have 
seen ‘the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly’, enabling the 
‘narrow horizon of bourgeois right’ to be ‘wholly cross[ed]’; and in which ‘the 
material conditions of production’ are the ‘co-operative property of the workers 
themselves’. This is a society that ‘inscribes on its banners: From each according 
to his ability, to each according to his needs’ (Marx, 2010b [1875], pp. 347-48); 
Thomas, 2008, p.146).  It is also a society of ‘truly human and social property’ in 
which ‘individual property’ and ‘socialised property’ in the means of production 
co-exist, and whose property rights structures promote both individual autonomy 
and social connection (Chitty, 2013). It is a society in which the economy is 
‘embedded’ (Polanyi, 2002 [1944]).  
 
In this context, the HRS provides a valuable material referent – a real working 
example which effects a reconciliation of the individual and the social in the 
means of production. We don’t wish to idealise the HRS, nor underestimate the 
extent to which it is rooted in Chinese culture and history and in a wider set of 
institutional arrangements, but its success does show that by dividing, sub-
dividing and allocating the rights in the property bundle it is possible to harness 
individual property’s ability to promote human dignity and autonomy and to ‘let 
loose’ human energy (its ‘positive essence’), without excluding co-operation, the 
division of labour and some degree of overall collective regulation and control of 
the productive process. Indeed, another of the striking things about the HRS is 
the way in which it seems to have been possible for the collectives involved to 
effect modest, consensually-agreed re-allocations of land use rights to restore 
equitable distributions and reflect changing household demographics (Kung, 
2000). The HRS, of course, only represents one way of allocating the rights in the 
ownership bundle over one resource; only one way of reconciling the individual 
with the social in the means of production. It isn’t the only or necessarily or in all 
circumstances the best way: on the contrary, the HRS highlights the need to dispel 
the idea that there is a closed list of institutional possibility. Likewise, bundle-of-
rights theories, while not resolving the difficulties we have envisioning a world 
radically different from our own, can help us avoid the narrowing of perceived 
possibility that flows from the tendency to view all property arrangements 
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through the simple prism of (full liberal) ‘ownership’. They remind us of the 
complexities of social relations, of the blurred boundaries between property and 
contract/obligation and show that it is possible to try to reconcile the individual 
and the social both within particular property rights structures and by constructing 
different property arrangements for different resources: individual private 
property rights structures for some things might co-exist with hybrid property 
rights structures (like the HRS) for others, and with common property and 
collective ownership of still others. They can, in other words, help us to expand 
our imaginative horizons and to articulate alternative visions which recognise the 
full diversity of possible institutional forms and the many ways in which property 
can, as Marx suggested, be simultaneously both individual and social.  
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